Translation of "Labor income" in German

And labor income is the most important component of household earnings, the major driver of consumption spending.

But cutting jobs reduces labor income, increases inequality and reduces final demand.

Moreover, a new labor law and income policies will further increase workforce costs.

The bottom line is that the "labor for income" game is slowly coming to an end.

But cutting jobs weakens final demand further, because it reduces labor income and increases inequality.

Thus, the total effect of the recession on labor income of jobs, hours and wage reductions is much larger.

Moreover, the total effect on labor income – the product of jobs times hours worked times average hourly wages – has been more severe than that implied by the job losses alone, because many firms are cutting their workers’ hours, placing them on furlough, or lowering their wages as a way to share the pain.

With an unemployment rate of 8.5%, a labor-force participation rate of only 64%, and stagnant real wages, labor income has fallen to an historic low of 44% of national income.

The countries that adopted the euro had poor labor-market institutions, bloated pension systems, high taxes on labor income, and inefficient service sectors in the late 1990’s, and they still do now.

The International Monetary Fund stressed the same conclusion in its recent Article IV consultation with China, noting that labor income is now expanding as a share of GDP, and that consumption contributed slightly more than investment to GDP growth in 2014.

Holes in the social safety net have led to high and rising levels of precautionary saving – driving a wedge between increases in labor income and any impetus to discretionary purchasing power.

By focusing on job creation in services, massive urbanization, and the broadening of its social safety net, there will be a big boost to labor income and consumer purchasing power.

As long as urbanization is coupled with job creation – a strategy underscored by China’s concomitant push into services-led development – labor income and consumer purchasing power will benefit.

In a globalized world where labor income is under constant pressure, the siren song of asset markets as a growth elixir is far too tempting for the body politic to resist.

Usually, this principle means that marginal tax rates should be similar at different levels of labor income, for various types of consumption, for outlays today versus tomorrow, and so on.

Rising inequality – owing partly to job-slashing corporate restructuring – is reducing aggregate demand further, because households, poorer individuals, and labor-income earners have a higher marginal propensity to spend than corporations, richer households, and capital-income earners.

The challenge, instead, will be to cope with the labor-reducing and income-inequality effects of emerging technologies.

Nonetheless, several features of current growth patterns stand out: excess productive capacity, persistent high leverage, declining labor content in goods-and-services production, and an increasingly unequal distribution of income both between labor and capital, and across labor-income segments, with their differential savings rates.

Far too many US households made enormous bets on the property bubble, believing that their paper gains were permanent substitutes for stagnant labor income.

The social benefits paid to the out-of-work increase the tax burden on labor income, which in turn discourages women from full-time work.

Second, reform of the hukou system could increase labor productivity, reduce income inequality, and accelerate urbanization.

Until the 1980s, about 70% of income went to labor income and 30% to capital income.

In the US, for example, slashing labor costs has sharply reduced the share of labor income in GDP.

As a result, total labor income – the product of jobs times hours worked times average hourly wages – has fallen dramatically.