Übersetzung für "Collusive outcome" in Deutsch

Moreover, similar margins of the parties would further increase the risk of a collusive outcome.

A collusive outcome is also more likely to be sustainable with fewer companies.

A collusive outcome is more likely in symmetric market structures.

Conversely, if the increment is large, the risk of a collusive outcome may be high even if the initial level of commonality of costs is low.

It would be most likely used to monitor deviations from the collusive outcome.

The stability of a collusive outcome also depends on the companies' discounting of future profits.

However, information exchange may in some situations also allow a collusive outcome to occur in more heterogeneous market structures.

Analysis: This information exchange makes a collusive outcome likely and is therefore likely have as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).

Analysis: It is likely that this purchasing agreement would give the parties the ability to coordinate their behaviour on the selling market, thereby leading to a collusive outcome.

Companies may find it difficult to achieve a collusive outcome in a complex market environment.

Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that even the exchange of aggregated data may facilitate a collusive outcome in markets with specific characteristics.

Information exchange can thereby facilitate a collusive outcome by increasing transparency in the market, reducing market complexity, buffering instability or compensating for asymmetry.

Namely, information exchange can make the market sufficiently transparent to allow the colluding companies to monitor to a sufficient degree whether other companies are deviating from the collusive outcome, and thus to know when to retaliate.

Companies are more likely to achieve a collusive outcome in markets which are sufficiently transparent, concentrated, non-complex, stable and symmetric.

In more unstable markets, more frequent exchanges of information may be necessary to facilitate a collusive outcome than in stable markets.

By the same token, a collusive outcome is more likely among companies that will continue to operate in the same market for a long time, as in such a scenario they will be more committed to coordinate.

In this context, the existence of barriers to entry makes it more likely that a collusive outcome on the market is feasible and sustainable.

Finally, in this case, since the parties form a very tight, non-complex and stable oligopoly, even the exchange of aggregated data could facilitate a collusive outcome in the market.

There may therefore also be a serious risk of anti-competitive coordination leading to a collusive outcome in the market.

Overall, for a collusive outcome to be sustainable, the threat of a sufficiently credible and prompt retaliation must be likely.

In markets with long-term contracts (which are indicative of infrequent price re-negotiations) a less frequent exchange of information would normally be sufficient to achieve a collusive outcome.

On the other hand, a direct limitation of competition between the parties, a collusive outcome or anti-competitive foreclosure is not likely to occur if the parties to the agreement do not have market power in the market in which the competition concerns are assessed.

The exchange of such information may facilitate coordination with regard to sales prices and output and thus lead to a collusive outcome on the selling markets.

Nevertheless, given the market structure and strategic nature of the data, this information exchange is likely to constitute an efficient mechanism for monitoring deviations from a collusive outcome, which would be likely to occur in this type of market setting.

Therefore, due to the extensive information exchange on a key parameter of competition with regard to Z, it is likely that the swap agreement between Companies A and B will give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) as it can lead to a collusive outcome.

One way is that through information exchange companies may reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination, which can lead to a collusive outcome on the market.