Translation of "Hohe staatsverschuldung" in English

Only Hungary has a large public debt.

High levels of government debt remain a challenge.

First, they will not be weighed down by high levels of public debt.

These include high levels of government debt which are limiting further stimulus programs, particularly in Europe.

Moreover, high levels of government debt limit the fiscal room for manoeuvre.

High government debt means a high debt servicing cost.

The sovereign public debt crisis shows that the current supervisory and remedial mechanisms are inadequate.

The prospects for the labour market and the emerging high national debt, however, are breathing down the Commissioner's neck.

It is nonsense to claim that excessive national debts have caused the current situation.

The high debt ratios will perpetuate vulnerability, and episodic surprises will ignite new crises.

However, rising unemployment, problems in the financial markets, high national debt and slow economic growth could lead to difficulties in terms of Member States' pension payment obligations, with repercussions on the Stability and Growth Pact and therefore the stability of the euro.

Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Spain are Member States which remain sensitive to fluctuations in the rate of interest on their national debt.

I should like to mention a number of economic criteria, such as the high rate of inflation which was over 100% and which is still over 50%, the high national debt as the result of the strain on the national budget from military expenditure and the military conflict with the PKK, high real interest rates, the continuing predominance of the public sector, huge regional differences in Turkey, a prosperity differential within Turkey of 1:10, which the European Union will never be able to bring under control, different educational qualifications, illiteracy, which still affects 27.6% of women, i.e. problems which Turkey itself must resolve.

The result has been large trade imbalances between eurozone countries, a problem compounded by large fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt in southern Europe (and France) – much of it owed to foreign creditors.

Another lesson from Japan is that a country with a large savings surplus can handle a large public debt, because it can be financed internally.

It is possible, Ramey argues, that their results could reflect a different sort of reverse causality if governments are more likely to respond to high public-debt levels with austerity programs when they have reason to believe that economic conditions could make the debt burden especially worrisome.

Even if one accepts the claim of the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff that very high public debt levels mean lower growth – a view that they never really established and that has subsequently been discredited – Australia is nowhere near that threshold.

That tendency will be even greater if the public senses that the consequences (distorted asset prices, high government debt, etc.) eventually must be reversed.

Thus, countries on the EU’s periphery – Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain – with large public debt and current-account deficits, face lower real wages and high unemployment for some time.

Worse still, high levels of public debt, like high taxes, cause serious problems for economic performance.

One reason is that fiscal authorities in many countries – in particular, in Japan and parts of Europe – have been constrained by high sovereign-debt levels.

Such a transfer of public debt would be unfair, Germany contends – not least because high levels of public debt are often accompanied by higher levels of household wealth than in northern Europe.

Given that a wealth tax would be used primarily to pay down high levels of existing public debt, it would be applied in the context of the individual member states.

For many years, high public debt and macroeconomic mismanagement forced Turkey to pay a huge interest-rate premium in international financial markets – money that might have otherwise been invested in schools.

In particular, high public indebtedness and macroeconomic developments in the area of export performance deserve attention as Italy has been losing external competitiveness since euro adoption.

Furthermore, it is clear that the high public debt of some Member States, caused at least in part by extended bank bail-out operations, is an obstacle to public investment and the sustainability of welfare spending.

Furthermore, it is clear that the high public debt of some Member States, caused at least in part by extended bank bail-out operations, is an obstacle to public investment and the sustainability of welfare spending.