Translation of "Von verfassungs wegen" in English

They cannot be prevented for constitutional reasons.

However, it is under no constitutional duty to do so.

Such interpretation is, however, not mandatory under constitutional law.

This legislative decision is, in principle, permissible under constitutional law.

Adjudication of conflicts between the "Länder" and the Reich government was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

In those cases, courts have the constitutional obligation to ensure that supplanting a collective agreement remains reasonable.

However, under constitutional law, courts may not be unreasonably strict as regards the fulfilment of the requirements for admitting an appeal.

However, the introduction of the legal form of the registered civil partnership was not constitutionally required.

According to the constitution, such integrational steps must be factually limited by the act of transfer and must, in principle, be revocable.

The respondent's statements which the applicant challenges are not objectionable under constitutional law, and therefore do not violate the applicant's right to have the equal opportunities of political parties respected.

As for the rest, the Senate has based its assessment of reasonableness on a restrictive interpretation of the challenged provisions which would not be mandated by constitutional law.

For constitutional reasons, the provision, however, must be interpreted in such a manner that communication on highly confidential matters is not excluded from the strict protection of the core area merely because it combines highly confidential with everyday matters (cf. BVerfGE 109, 279 < 330 > ).

It has already been determined (see 2 f cc (4) above) that an instrument such as the provision on the minimum wage total is, in principle, required for constitutional reasons in order to ensure, in principle, that the exemption is appropriate. However, this does not answer the question whether the specific design also complies with the right to equality.

However, the degree of protection of professional groups and other groups of persons whose activities require, for constitutional reasons, that their communication be treated as particularly confidential is not viably designed in all respects.

In particular, the legislature is not bound by the Constitution to spare the parties concerned every burden nor to meet every additional burden with a transitional provision in case of system changes or transitions to a new legal situation.

I agree with the majority of the Senate that there are fundamentally no constitutional objections to introducing a legal form of registered civil partnership for same-sex couples.

It is therefore constitutionally required not to agree dynamic treaty provisions with a blanket character, or if they can still be interpreted in a manner that respects the responsibility for integration, to establish, at any rate, suitable safeguards for the effective exercise of such responsibility.

Thus, the drawing of an overall analogy, which results in a demand for a judicially reviewable mandatory offer in the case of a voluntary delisting, is permissible, but not required under the constitution.

However, the legislature is not constitutionally obliged to ensure that the unequal treatment between transfers of preferentially treated and other assets is appropriate by an exact definition of the circle of small and medium-sized companies and by limiting an exemption without an economic needs test to these companies.

The Constitution bars it from identifying with any political party and from using the possibilities and state assets of which it disposes to aid or hinder any party.

No other legal community, no association of persons, even if it is designed to provide long-term mutual support, is therefore constitutionally protected as an institution in a comparable way.

This, however, does not raise an insurmountable obstacle under constitutional law to a technical integration of a European deployment of armed forces via joint general staffs, nor to the formation of joint forces or to agreement on and coordination of joint European weapons procurement.

Furthermore, such determination cannot be made under constitutional law, because it would mean, in particular, that terrorists would be able to predict the state’s response.

After all, the fact that deployments of the armed forces with military weapons are not allowed in either case of disaster emergencies, and therefore are constitutionally prohibited under Art. 87a sec. 2 GG, can also be established by interpreting the Constitution historically, and even more so by interpreting the Basic Law systematically.

This must be assumed in particular if the statute is intended to guarantee that the measure agreed under international law has the connection to parliament which is fundamentally constitutionally required and if reviewing the Act of assent and the accompanying legislation separately would mean both artificially splitting up a unified fact situation and also subordinating them to different yardsticks.