Translation of "Billigen geldes" in English

The era of easy money is past.

It is sad that the era of cheap money is over.

Because of the cheap money, the bank can easily make the payment.

Easier monetary policy may boost liquidity, but it will not resolve the solvency crisis.

It's more the mistake of cheap money, triggered by the mortgage crisis in the US.

In fact, the devaluation of 1931 set the stage for an era of cheap money, which made 1930s Britain a much less dismal place than it had been under the economic orthodoxy of the gold standard in the 1920s.

The term “supply side” is intended to distinguish these new policies from the traditional demand-side measures of easy money and a slightly larger fiscal deficit that are already aimed at strengthening economic activity.

The era of cheap or zero-interest money that led to a wall of liquidity chasing high yields and assets – equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities – in emerging markets is drawing to a close.

Similarly, global monetary policy was easy, avoiding another big mistake of the 1930’s.

Moreover, the Ukrainian Central Bank's philosophy still sticks to old-fashioned centrally planned money-growth management by having both tight and loose monetary policy at the same time.

The Fed’s easy money policy is now stoking US inflation rather than a recovery.

Whether referring to the dotcom bubble a decade ago or the real estate crisis in Spain or the United States, the crisis originated in a glut of cheap money, in an environment in which the sender and the recipient were unacquainted.

Under his responsibility, the Fed pursued a policy of cheap money, encouraged risky financial transactions and triggered that "consumerism mecca on credit," which resulted in the distortions of the financial markets and the global economy, as Ingeborg Harms analyzed in the business section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (4 August 2010): Ayn Rand, a Bolshevik of Capital saw the Superman as Entrepreneur. Greenspan assessed positively the much-discussed factor of "greed."

We live on credit. We shift costs and risks into the future, and using the policy of cheap money we allow ourselves a prosperity that has to be paid by others.

So on balance, the ECB has indeed stabilised the situation for the time being but as expected, its policy of cheap money has not been able to solve Europe's problems.

A “cheap money” policy cuts down on the general debt burden and lightens the interest service on the national debt, on the one hand, and adds to the state’s demand for credit the demands of industry and consumers, on the other. It makes possible a rapid advance of production at the cost of increasing indebtedness and rising inflation.

Still, in Japan it is not the consolidation of public finances which is the focus of policy; rather the government has launched a new initiative to supplement the low-interest-rate policy and the strategy of cheap money from the central bank (BoJ) by increasing public expenditures.

There has been the method of cheap money for the monopoly banks lasting until today, which has fueled speculation internationally and on the average increased state debt by 30 percent internationally compared to the pre-crisis level.

Mario Draghi has learned the lesson: he'll take his time before announcing the end of the cheap money era.

These currencies benefited by having higher yields on government debt while the Fed’s quantitative easing or QE kept a steady stream of easy money flowing through the economy.

What I can definitely say is that the interest rate on credit which can be raised on the international money markets will increase, and therefore the so-called "age of cheap money" – in which one could obtain credit at low interest rates – is now changing, and the process of interest rate rises has begun.

Increasing uncertainties in world politics, the trade dispute with the USA, a high level of international debt after a decade of cheap money—all this is threatening to impact negatively on the economy.

In view of the European Central Bank's surprising step to cut the key interest rate to a historic low of 0.25 percent, and given the continued cheap money policy in the US and Japan, the pressure on yields is likely to persist.Â

In the short term, however, "Japanese conditions" are expected to continue: a policy of cheap money with more government debt, without actually having any effect of increasing growth.

In short, in his article, the author makes quite a conclusive statement in that the USA can hardly attribute its (impressive) economic growth since the 1970's to actual creation of value, but to a continuance of bubbles in financial, real-estate and insurance branches, fuelled especially by a policy of cheap money.

A "cheap money" policy cuts down on the general debt burden and lightens the interest service on the national debt, on the one hand, and adds to the state's demand for credit the demands of industry and consumers, on the other. It makes possible a rapid advance of production at the cost of increasing indebtedness and rising inflation.