Übersetzung für "Das gericht hat festgestellt" in Englisch

The court has determined:

The Court of First Instance has established that the exception aimed at protecting “legal advice”, set out in Article 4(2), second indent of the Regulation, applies to any legal advice given by the Legal Service of the institutions and is not limited to advice given in the course of litigation.

Moreover, according to the UK authorities, waste arising from the extraction of rock to produce cut stone is likely to consist largely of the chippings of the same rock which is being extracted.

As expressed by the General Court, the legitimacy of such a widely defined public service remit rests upon the qualitative requirements for the services offered by a public service broadcaster [40].

The Court has also found that an information exchange system may constitute a breach of the competition rules even when the market is not highly concentrated but there is a reduction of the undertakings' decision-making autonomy resulting from pressure during subsequent discussions with competitors (42).

The question was whether the greenhouse companies would switch to coal because of the higher prices for gas and whether the preferential tariffs could therefore constitute rational economic behaviour on the part of the gas company.

The UK authorities maintain that, the exemptions are a necessary and proportionate means of achieving the environmental objective of the AGL and any aid arising from the exemptions would lead to very little or no distortion of competition.

The Court has also consistently held that the obligation on a State to abolish aid regarded by the Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation [60].

In order to comply with the Court ruling, the Commission was required to adopt a new decision which provided clear reasoning on the point where the Court noted an error of reasoning and corrected the two manifest errors of assessment identified by the Court.

First, the General Court finds that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in approving the recapitalisation of SNCM as a measure which did not constitute State aid.

The General Court found that OHIM had made errors of law concerning the protection of the earlier rights and the use of the appellation concerned.

The Court finds that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to carry out an objective analysis of the competition situation in the absence of the agreement.

The Tribunal first held that the provisions of the Staff Regulations which allow an official to submit to the Director of OLAF a complaint against an act of OLAF adversely affecting him in connection with investigations by OLAF were adopted by the Community legislature in 2004 in order to guarantee judicial protection for persons covered by the Staff Regulations and that those provisions constituted the corollary of the new powers conferred on OLAF by the legislature when the reform of the Staff Regulations was adopted.

Given that the General Court found that the trustee was not independent of the parties, it was under no obligation to examine whether that trustee actually acted in a way which was evidence of his lack of independence.

When use of a trade mark by a third party is use "as a trade mark" is a question of fact which falls to the national court to determine in the light of the information available to it for the purpose of deciding the case.

However, the Court of First Instance held that the documents supplied by the Commission do not establish that the wholesalers wished to give Bayer the impression that, in response to its declared wish, they were proposing to reduce their orders to a given level.

The Court however limited that solution to cases in which two conditions are cumulatively satised.

Having regard to the foregoing, it must be held that the Court of First Instance was correct in its view that the period for replying to the complaint had begun to run on 5 November 1997, in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, with the consequence that, the action should have been brought no later than 15 June 1998, which, as the Court of First Instance observed, was well before the date on which it was in fact brought.

The Court observed that the applicants were direct competitors of the hotel receiving the aid in question and that they were recognised as having this status in the contested decision.

The Court considered that the Commission had failed to examine whether such a default in payment conferred a real economic advantage permitting it to be classied as State aid.

The Court acknowledged that an inhibiting eect on the Commission, contrary to the general Community interest, might arise if the concept of a serious breach were construed as comprising all errors or mistakes which, even if of some gravity, are not by their nature or extent alien to the normal conduct of an institution with the task of overseeing the application of the competition rules, which are complex and subject to a considerable degree of discretion.

In that regard, the Court of First Instance held that disclosure of advice such as the legal opinion in question could, first, give rise to lingering doubts as to the lawfulness of legislative acts to which such advice relates and, secondly, could compromise the independence of the opinions of the Council’s legal service; thus the Council made no error of assessment in deciding that there was a general interest in the protection of legal opinions such as that in question.

In that regard, the Court of First Instance did not in any way find that the wholesalers did not intend to deceive Bayer as to their export intentions.

In this case, the Commission had not exceeded the limits on its power of assessment in taking the view that scope of the levy in question could be justied by the pursuit of the desired environmental objectives and, accordingly, that the levy did not constitute State aid.

The Court found, moreover, that in a case where installations/facilities belonging to the contractual partners of an undertaking which represents the essential part of demand form a bottleneck for its competitors, the Commission may impose on that undertaking, as a burden constituting a condition of an exemption, shared use of the facilities between that undertaking and its competitors, since, in the absence of such use, those competitors would be deprived of any real opportunity of entering and remaining on the relevant market.

The Court held that the eect of such a decision is to bring to an end the proceedings to establish and penalise an infringement of the competition rules.