Translation of "Collateralized debt obligation" in German

The originate-to-distribute model of these vehicles increased risk in financial markets: The originator of credits or mortgages passed them on to the provider of funds or to a bundler who then securitized them and sold the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to investors (CRS 2008, 11).

This means no cross-border sovereign debt (or esoteric instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations).

This procedure was called securitization and the securities created were called collateralized debt obligations, CDO's.

The investment banks blended these securities into “asset-backed securities” and “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs) and sold them on to financial institutions throughout the world. These institutions, attracted by the high rates of return that were promised, invariably neglected the downside risks.

Making the necessary modifications is a delicate task rendered more difficult by the fact that many mortgages have been sliced up and repackaged in the form of collateralized debt obligations.

Investment banks then earn fees for re-packaging these securities in tranches of collateralized debt obligations, or CDO’s (and sometimes into CDO’s of CDO’s).

For years, hundreds of billions of new mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) generated from them were sold to the world to compensate for the lack of savings in the United States and to finance American housing investment.

No one knew the real value of credit-default swaps and of the various tranches of collateralized debt obligations.

The just-collapsed credit bubble, fueled by so-called special investment vehicles, derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and phony triple-A ratings, was built on the illusions of mathematical modeling.

To be sure, they will help to prevent banks from using instruments resembling collateralized debt obligations (which banks use to repackage individual loans for placement on secondary markets) to reduce their exposure.

Thus, total losses on mortgage-related instruments – include exotic credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – will add up to more than $400 billion.

From credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations for consumer debt to complex derivative schemes used to mask the debt of entire countries such as the collusion of investment bank Goldman Sachs and Greece which nearly collapsed the entire European economy.

The impact of these measures on the future credit supply -- the funding of which is facilitated in part by issuance of re-securitizations such as certain collateralized debt obligations ( CDOs ) - should be assessed in the light of the level of their issuance in the post-crisis market environment .

Barofsky also pointed out there was never the prosecution of the widespread subprime mortgages and collateralized debt obligations, done to maximize profit without regard to risk, despite their much bigger impact on society and economy compared to Abacus Bank's lending practices.

Indeed, the much-vaunted market for collateralized debt obligations, which divides risks into tranches and places the different risk levels in different places according to the willingness to accept them, has plausibly played a role in boosting asset prices.

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs, mainly tied to mortgages) made a new population of aspiring homeowners supposedly creditworthy by enabling the originating banks to sell “sub-prime” debt to other investors.

What started with subprime mortgages spread to all collateralized debt obligations, endangered municipal and mortgage insurance and reinsurance companies and threatened to unravel the multi-trillion-dollar credit default swap market.

Think of collateral debt obligations (CDOs) as poisoned sausages, says the economist Nouriel Roubini, with sub-prime mortgages as the rat meat in them.

She observed that agricultural futures and energy futures were being packaged and sold just like CDOs (collateralized debt obligations), but in this case they were called CCOs (collateralized commodity obligations).

Because these suffering American mortgage credits had largely been packed into non-transparent credit derivatives (Collateralized Debt Obligations = CDO) which were sold on into the whole world, the drop in their price and the connected massive increase in risk premiums led to a global chain reaction which overlapped with the mortgage crises in Great Britain, Ireland and Spain.

This system relies on investors to provide the funding for mortgage loans that are pooled and sold as collateralized debt obligations or CDOs.

The murky alphabet soup of financial instruments—i.e., SIVs (structured investment vehicles), CDOs (collateralized debt obligations), etc.—had been devised to "securitize" sub-prime mortgages, conceal their dubious character, and spread risk among a large number of institutions.

The collateralized debt obligations, collateralized mortgage-backed securities, and other computer-spawned complexities and playthings were not the solutions to basic needs in the economy, but to unslaked greed on Wall Street.

The wild inflation of financial assets—what Marx called fictitious capital—was centered on corporate shares rather than newfangled, exotic securities like CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) and CDSs (credit default swaps).