Übersetzung für "Mitgliedsbanken" in Englisch

The three interested parties also refer to the Commission decision on the aid to Banco di Sicilia and Sicilcassa [44], where the Commission concluded that the intervention of the FITD in favour of those banks did not constitute State aid, without considering the role of the Banca d'Italia in respect of the activities of the FITD.

Italy submits that the Commission is applying the market economy operator principle as developed in the context of the most recent bank restructuring cases (the ‘burden-sharing test’), overlooking the fact that a burden-sharing test is irrelevant for assessing the rationality of the behaviour of a private entity, because it aims primarily at protecting the interests of the general public (all taxpayers) and not the specific interests of those directly exposed to the failing bank (such as the FITD).

The three interested parties refer to an estimated EUR 1,9 billion expense in the event of liquidation, only part of which could have been recovered (calculated in the […] report at EUR 1,5 billion).

Such measures are financed ex post, by mandatory contributions provided by the member banks.

Governance arrangements within payment systems may also risk distorting competition between member banks.

Both serve as refinancing centres of their respective member institutions.

The Groupement has adopted price measures which hinder the issuing of cards in France at competitive rates by certain member banks,

As in the years before, the vdp in 2008 represented the interests of its member banks in cross-border mortgage lending.

The higher the discount rate, the higher the rate of interest that member banks must charge their customers.

In other words, once the reserve of 50 billion euros has been set up - in fact, as 50 billion euros was planned for 15 countries, this sum is reduced to 40 billion euros for 11 countries, 39.46 billion euros to be precise -, we can estimate that the excess that will remain in the coffers of the banks that are members of the ESCB will represent around 400 billion dollars.

Whereas members of the Fed’s Washington-based Board of Governors are nominated by the US president, subject to Senate confirmation, the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks are appointed by local boards.

Leaving aside the obligations incurred under the FITD's public mandate, therefore, the Commission concludes that none of the three measures would have been adopted by a market economy operator.

The three interested parties submit that, as in Doux Élevage, public supervision of the FITD does not go beyond the exercise of a mere formal verification of the validity and the lawfulness of the FITD's behaviour; it does not extend to verification of political appropriateness or of compliance with policy pursued by the public authorities: as in Doux Élevage, the FITD itself decides how to use its resources.

Therefore, in Italy's view, the FITD's decision not to involve subordinated bondholders was reasonable, was in line with the market economy operator principle, and was such as to prevent the FITD and its member banks from being exposed to further costs.

The three interested parties observe that the measures were designed on the basis of the least-cost criterion, and that a reputable auditing and advisory firm was engaged to help to identify the least costly and risky solution for the member banks.

Moreover, it should be presumed that the FITD's intervention did not confer any advantage on Tercas, as it occurred alongside the injection of capital into Tercas by BPB, which was concurrent, significant and comparable to the FITD's action.

A key measure was the "MERFA" (“Mécanisme Régulateur de la Fonction Acquéreur”), a formula determining whether a fee of up to EUR 11 on each card issued should be paid by member banks that are not "sufficiently" active in terms of acquiring merchants or installing automated teller machines (ATMs).

But the FITD's actions are indeed dependent upon public objectives that are specific, fixed and defined by the public authorities, and controlled by them, notably the policy objectives of protecting depositors.

This is aggravated by the mechanism by which the FITD decides such measures, as described in recital 36, which is skewed in favour of large banks [95] in such a way that decisions to intervene can be taken against the will of the majority of the member banks.

No market economy operator would have to fulfil the obligations deriving from a public mandate, such as the obligation to reimburse depositors in the event of a liquidation of Tercas.