Translation of "Budgetrecht" in English

An important subject for the future to be dealt with by the convention will be the Parliament's budget rights.

That is why Parliament must keep its budgetary powers.

We regard this essential to our budgetary law.

Does it breach the budget law of the Federal Parliament by having the ECB transfer high risks to Germany?

That does not require any special justification here in Parliament, given that no-one except Parliament need defend its budget rights.

From my own point of view, I can only stress what Mrs Haug said, that the real issue is: will the European Parliament continue to have these reduced budgetary powers on the revenue side as it does on the expenditure side?

Discussions are taking place on budgetary rights, the essential right of any parliament, which represent the origins and the starting point of any process of democratisation: the right of Parliament, the directly elected representatives of the people, to make decisions on financial resources.

At the last but one meeting the Italian Presidency took the appropriate steps to safeguard our budgetary rights, and I hope that position will survive through to the end.

This would entail both judicial control by the European Court of Justice and parliamentary control by way of the European Parliament's budgetary rights.

Do they not know that parliamentarianism is the pillar of democracy and that Parliament’s budgetary powers are the pillar of parliamentarianism?

The Convention should take up this important parliamentary report; and, in our proposals to the Convention, which we shall be discussing next week, the Commission will propose clear principles and provisions, advocating in particular that Parliament be given full budgetary powers.

The general budget of the Community still does not include all Community funds such as the development fund and borrowing and lending operations, which are consequently not fully covered by the EP's budgetary powers;

Its essential tasks include the passing of laws, the election of the Federal Chancellor, control of the Federal Government and the adoption of the national budget ('power of the purse').

With regard to the German Bundestag 's right to decide on the budget affected by this, this is a case of the creation of obligations whose effects may be equivalent to a transfer of sovereign powers if the Bundestag is no longer able to dispose of its budget on its own responsibility.

Since the Parliament's budget law applies to the Federal Government's borrowing and its debt management activities, Finance Agency is subject to special public control - defined by the Federal Government Debt Management Act (Bundesschuldenwesengesetz).

The German Bundestag has long recognised the explosiveness of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and is insisting on its own budgetary powers.

To the extent that supranational agreements are entered into which by reason of their scale may be of structural significance for parliament’s right to decide on the budget, the German Bundestag, in the plenary session, must decide on every large-scale measure resulting in expenditure and on fundamental questions of the manner in which the funds provided are dealt with.

Although it had no say in the formation of the cabinet, it could influence government by its participation in lawmaking and its budgetary power.

There is a violation of the right to vote if the German Bundestag relinquishes its parliamentary budget responsibility with the effect that it or a future Bundestag can no longer exercise the right to decide on the budget on its own responsibility.

Since the OMT Decision can create liability and payment risks affecting the federal budget to such an extent that the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag, and thus also its budgetary rights, can be impaired, the decision also violates the principle of democracy enshrined in Art. 20 sec. 1 and 2 GG, and impairs the constitutional identity of the Basic Law, which the eternity clause of Art. 79 sec. 3 GG protects not only against amendments of the Constitution but also against an erosion in the process of European integration.

The next step was "representative government", a settler parliament which controlled the budget, but which had to deal with a powerful governor appointed by London.

The Bundestag has not eroded its right to decide on the budget in a constitutionally impermissible manner and thus disregarded the material content of the principle of democracy.

From a democratic point of view, this undermines democratic legitimacy even further – given the fact, that the last determinations of deeper economic and monetary union have already de facto removed the budget right of national parliaments.

Even if such commitments assume a substantial size, parliament's right to decide on the budget has not been infringed in a way that could be challenged with reference to the right to vote.

Whether the budgetary autonomy of the German Bundestag, which is guaranteed by Art. 20 sec. 1 and 2 in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 GG, and its overall budgetary responsibility can be affected by the OMT Decision or its implementation with regard to possible losses of the Bundesbank, is not clearly foreseeable at present.